编者语：
文章指出自金融危机以来美国在金融监管体系监管方面取得了重要的进展和突破，首先是系统性重要机构的风险抗压能力得到加强，随后作者介绍了金融体系四个重要的结构性变化：其一是三方回购系统（使机构投资者与需要资助其证券投资组合的银行经纪商相匹配）已经变得更加安全；其二是非处方衍生产品活动从双边结算转向中央结算；其三是更多地关注中央交易对手（CCP）的实力和弹性；其四是美国货币市场共同基金行业的改革。敬请阅读。
文/William C. Dudley；编译/邵杨楠
在金融危机八年后来评估我们的工作，我将提出三点看法。首先，我们在加强全球金融体系的安全和健全方面取得了相当大的进展。美国是危机的中心，一个系统重要的金融公司的失败风险已大大下降。第二，虽然在结束“大而不倒”方面取得了重大进展，但仍有许多工作要做。虽然全球系统重要性金融机构的失败风险已经减少，但并没有被消除。没有良好运作的解决过程，这种失败的后果仍然可能是灾难性的。美国已经在制定单点进入解决机制方面取得了很大进展，该机制具有一个总损耗吸收能力（TLAC）层，这将有助于资本重组，并有序地解决问题。然而，仍然存在重大挑战，特别是在跨境基础上管理解决方案。第三，银行领导人还有很多工作要重建其行业的可信赖性。金融危机后长期，行为失败持续。我们需要金融公司来培养那些不良行为零容忍，并注意鼓励这种行为的激励结构的文化。
所以，让我从好消息开始。与金融危机前夕的十年前相比，美国的金融体系更具弹性。这一进展反映了一些倡议——一些侧重于企业吸收冲击的能力，另一些侧重于减少跨越企业及其对手方的活动的金融体系内的结构脆弱性。
在美国和全球的资本和流动性要求的变化使银行更具弹性和强大。美国主要的银行机构今天拥有比危机前更多的资本，更高质量的资本和更大的流动性缓冲。巴塞尔协议III的风险加权资本标准框架得到了显着加强——对大型银行和银行控股公司也施加了更强的要求和补充杠杆比率要求，以限制整体杠杆。此外，也许最重要的是，资本要求现在变得更加前瞻。每年，银行的资本股利和股份回购计划是根据银行在资产组合下在极度压力的经济和市场环境下可能拥有的资本额来评估的。年度综合资本和分析审查（CCAR）流程推动美国银行改善资本规划流程，并在必要时迫使它们保留更多的收入和建立资本。因此，现在这些银行比金融危机前的风险小得多，因为它们的脆弱性被一个高但不可持续的盈利水平所掩盖。
在流动性方面，也有显着的改善。流动性覆盖率和净稳定资金比率要求迫使银行持有更高质量的流动资产，并缩短了到期期限转换的范围。银行用短期资金为流动性低，难以实现的资产融资的能力和意愿是造成金融危机的一个重要因素。
此外，我认为监督有所改善。更重视跨系统重要企业的横向评估，更加重视银行治理，风险管理，网络安全，银行数据和技术能力。
但是，进展不仅仅在于提高个别机构的实力。由于一些重要的倡议，整个系统也更加强大。由于时间限制，我今天不能详尽无遗。但是，金融体系有四个重要的结构性变化，值得强调。首先，三方回购系统（使机构投资者与需要资助其证券投资组合的银行经纪商相匹配）已经变得更加安全。在危机之前，每天早晨，两个大型清算银行向隔夜借款人提供大量的日内信贷，当一夜之间的现金返还给贷款人时。这些临时的信贷延期已经大部分被取消。这是一项重要的结构性改革，因为这些风险在金融危机期间被证明是不稳定的。特别是，当一个主要交易商受到压力时，清算银行有动机重新评估其对交易商的大额透支敞口，这是一个重要的传染渠道。
另一个重要的变化是非处方衍生产品活动从双边结算转向中央结算。虽然这种转变在金融危机时已经在进行，但是现在已经通过资本和抵押制度的重要变化加以支持，这通过加强结构激励和中央交易清算来加速进程。当银行解决与中央交易对手（CCP）的交易时，它降低系统中的风险。可以扣除暴露，交易对手风险从许多个别公司转移到清除交易的单一CCP。虽然清算活动的这种转变还有一段路要走，但随着传统行业的成熟，中央清算交易的比例将继续上升。
第三个重要的结构变化是更多地关注CCP的实力和弹性。因为CCP现在将发挥更重要的作用，他们必须坚强和有弹性。在这方面已经有许多重要的倡议。最重要的是，颁布“金融市场基础设施原则”（PFMI）中所体现的国际标准，这是在我主持支付和结算系统委员会（CPSS）时制定的 - 以及目前正在进行的金融市场基础设施分解。
第四个重要的结构性变化是美国货币市场共同基金行业的改革。10月14日实施的主要机构货币市场共同基金的浮动净资产价值（NAV）大大降低了它们的使用，并鼓励银行和其他借款人找到不太容易运行的资金来源。
金融危机暴露了货币市场共同基金行业的两个重要缺陷。首先，固定的NAV结构创造了一个先发优势，鼓励运行。也就是说，如果一个基金面临压力，那些快速收回资金的投资者就获得了面值。第二，虽然货币市场共同基金投资往往是抵押品，但资金本身在危机中不愿意接受抵押品。相反，他们往往在出现问题的第一个迹象，这使得金融系统不稳定。
在使美国金融体系更安全，更不容易发生恐慌方面取得了很大进展。然而，还有更多的事情要做，我们可以说，我们已经结束“大而不倒”。这是我们绝对必须完成的工作。特别是，美国银行控股公司必须做出更多努力，使其组织可以根据Title I破产或Title II决议解决。这要求拥有干净的母公司结构，较少的公司复杂性，以及即使母公司变得不可行也能够继续运营的基本服务和支持操作。
此外，虽然在制定可行的决议制度方面取得了重大进展——根据“多德——弗兰克法案”第二章建立的单一入境制度——我们仍然必须确保这一制度能够安全地用于跨部门，边界基础。这要求充分实施TLAC框架，并更明确地界定不同监督和监管机构的期望和责任，这些机构必须在国际上一起工作。特别是，这包括在解决的早期阶段如何向无力偿债公司提供流动性，以便公司的业务可以有序地解决，而不会破坏全球金融系统的稳定性。
最后，我想谈谈银行文化和行为的问题。虽然在这里已经有相当大的努力，但还有很多事要做。银行必须恢复其可信度。只有这样，他们才能有效地履行其关键的金融中介作用，从储蓄者到借款人的资金，以及帮助公司和家庭管理他们的财务和风险暴露。
正如我看到的，激励驱动行为，行为建立了定义文化的社会规范。这意味着银行领导需要密切关注他们在薪酬和促销方面的激励措施。
此外，银行领导人必须培养一种鼓励人们在发现可疑行为时鼓励人们发表意见的气氛。 Preet Bharara是纽约南区美国检察官，他在10月份在纽约美联储银行文化会议上发言时强调了让人们发言的重要性。银行领导人应该承认并奖励那些说话的人。在塑造文化中，行动胜于言语。建立适当的激励措施，营造一个人们觉得他们可以说话的环境，将大大有助于加强银行文化。
我很高兴许多银行领导人和董事会正在努力改善他们公司的文化，我非常感谢G30在这方面的努力。我认为大多数领导者认识到，良好的文化与强大的财务业绩完全一致，它有助于银行吸引维持这种业绩所需的人才。然而，如果这一努力在整个行业得到协调，我们可以更快地取得更大的进展。我认为银行领导人可以从分享最佳做法和参与调查中受益，这些调查将允许他们持续地对其优势和弱点进行基准比较。
建立一个更有弹性和更强大的金融体系，建立一个可靠地结束“太大而不能失败”的银行解决机制，建立恢复金融业可信赖性的强大文化是我们必须继续追求的目标。没有在所有三条战线上取得成功，我认为我们不能说我们完全解决了金融危机所显现的问题。
附英文原文：
In assessing where we are eight years after the financial crisis, I would make three broad observations. First, we have made considerable progress in bolstering the safety and soundness of the global financial system. In the U.S., which was the epicenter of the crisis, the risk of a failure of a systemically important financial firm has declined considerably. Second, although significant progress has been made toward ending “too big to fail,” there is still much more to do. While the risk of failure of a global systemically important financial institution has diminished, it has not been eliminated. Without a well-functioning resolution process, the consequences of such a failure could still be catastrophic. Much headway has been made in the U.S. in developing a Single Point of Entry resolution regime with a layer of total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) that would facilitate recapitalization and enable an orderly resolution. However, significant challenges remain, especially on managing resolution on a cross-border basis. Third, bank leaders still have much to do to rebuild the trustworthiness of their industry. Long after the financial crisis, conduct failures have persisted. We need financial firms to foster cultures that are intolerant of bad conduct and that are attentive to incentive structures that may encourage such behaviors.
So, let me begin with the good news. The U.S. financial system is much more resilient now than it was a decade ago on the eve of the financial crisis. This progress reflects a number of initiatives―some focused on the ability of firms to absorb shocks, and others oriented at reducing structural vulnerabilities within the financial system that spanned the activities of firms and their counterparties.
Changes made to capital and liquidity requirements in the U.S. and globally have made banks more resilient and robust. The major U.S. banking organizations today have much more capital, much higher-quality capital, and much larger liquidity buffers than prior to the crisis. On the capital side, we have taken a belt-and-suspenders approach. The Basel III risk-weighted capital standards framework has been significantly strengthened―a stronger belt―and a supplemental leverage ratio requirement has also been imposed on large banks and bank holding companies to restrain overall leverage―the suspenders. In addition, and perhaps most importantly, the capital requirements have now become much more forward-looking. Each year a bank’s capital dividend and share-repurchase plan is assessed against the amount of capital the bank would potentially have under an extremely stressed economic and market environment given its portfolio of assets. The annual Comprehensive Capital and Analysis Review (CCAR) process has pushed U.S. banks to improve their capital planning processes and forced them, when needed, to retain more earnings and to build up their capital. As a result, these banks are much less risky now than they were prior to the financial crisis, when their vulnerability was masked by a high, but unsustainable, level of profitability.
On the liquidity side, there has also been significant improvement. The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and the Net Stable Funding Ratio requirements have forced banks to hold more high-quality liquid assets and have reduced the scope for maturity transformation. The ability and willingness of banks to finance illiquid, hard-to-value assets with short-term funding was an important element that contributed to the financial crisis.
In addition, I believe that supervisory oversight has improved. There is more attention on horizontal evaluations across the systemically important firms and a greater emphasis on bank governance, risk management, cyber security, and bank data and technology capabilities than in the past.
But the progress has not just been in terms of enhancing the strength of individual institutions. The system as a whole is also stronger because of a number of important initiatives. Due to time constraints, I cannot be exhaustive today. But, there are four important structural changes to the financial system that are worth highlighting. First, the tri-party repo system—which matches institutional investors with bank dealers that need to fund their securities portfolios—has been made much safer. Before the crisis, each morning the two large clearing banks provided huge amounts of intraday credit to their tri-party repo borrowers when cash invested overnight was returned to lenders. These temporary extensions of credit have been largely eliminated. This is an important structural reform because these exposures had proven to be destabilizing during the financial crisis. In particular, when a major dealer became stressed, the clearing banks were motivated to reassess their large overdraft exposures to the dealer, and that turned out to be an important channel of contagion.
Another important change has been the shift in over-the-counter derivatives activity from bilateral settlement to central clearing. Although this shift was already underway at the time of the financial crisis, it has now been underpinned by important changes to the capital and collateral regime, which has accelerated the process by strengthening the incentives to structure and clear trades centrally.
When banks settle their trades with central counterparties (CCPs), it reduces risk in the system. Exposures can be netted, and the counterparty risk is shifted from many individual firms to the single CCP that clears the trades. Although this shift in clearing activity still has some way to go, the proportion of centrally cleared trades will continue to rise as legacy trades mature.
A third important structural change is the increased focus on the strength and resiliency of CCPs. Because CCPs are now going to play a more significant role, they must be strong and resilient. There have been many important initiatives in this regard. Foremost, perhaps, is the promulgation of the international standards embodied in the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (PFMI)—which were developed when I chaired the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS)—and the work currently underway on financial market infrastructure resolution.
A fourth significant structural change has been reform of the U.S. money market mutual fund industry. The October 14th implementation of floating net asset values (NAVs) for prime institutional money market mutual funds has dramatically reduced their use and has encouraged banks and other borrowers to find sources of funding that are less prone to runs.
The financial crisis exposed two important flaws of the money market mutual fund industry. First, the fixed NAV structure created a first-mover advantage that encouraged runs. That is, if a fund came under stress, investors who quickly withdrew their funds received par value. Second, although money market mutual fund investments are often collateralized, the funds themselves have no desire to take possession of the collateral in a crisis. Instead, they tend to head for the exits at the first sign of trouble, which makes the financial system less stable.
Much progress has been made in making the U.S. financial system safer and less prone to panics. Still, there is more to do before we can say that we have ended “too big to fail.” This is work that we absolutely must complete. In particular, U.S. bank holding companies must do more to make their organizations resolvable under either Title I bankruptcy or Title II resolution. This requires having clean parent holding company structures, less corporate complexity, and essential service and support operations that are able to continue to operate even when the parent company becomes non-viable.
Also, while there has been significant progress in terms of developing a workable resolution regime—the Single Point of Entry regime established under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act—we still have to ensure that this regime can be safely utilized on a cross-border basis. This requires fully implementing the TLAC framework, and defining more explicitly the expectations and responsibilities of the different supervisory and regulatory oversight bodies that would have to work together internationally. In particular, this includes how liquidity would be provided to an insolvent firm during the early stages of resolution, so that the firm’s operations could be wound down in an orderly way without destabilizing the global financial system.
Finally, I would like to address the issue of bank culture and conduct. Although there has been considerable effort here, there is still much more to do. Banks must restore their trustworthiness. Only then can they effectively perform their critical financial intermediation role in funneling funds from savers to borrowers, and in helping firms and households manage their finances and risk exposure.
As I see it, incentives drive behavior, and behavior establishes the social norms that define culture. This means that bank leaders need to take a close look at the incentives they put in place with respect to compensation and promotion in particular.
In addition, bank leaders must foster an atmosphere that encourages people to speak up when they witness questionable behavior. Preet Bharara, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, highlighted the importance of getting people to speak up when he spoke at the New York Fed’s conference on bank culture in October. He argued—and I agree—that big problems can be nipped in the bud when people speak up and senior management responds appropriately. Therefore, bank leaders ought to recognize and reward those who speak up. Actions speak louder than words in shaping culture. Establishing appropriate incentives and fostering an environment in which people feel they can speak up would go a long way toward bolstering bank culture.
I am gratified that many bank leaders and boards of directors are working hard to improve their firms’ cultures, and I very much appreciate the G30’s efforts in this area. I think most leaders recognize that good culture is fully consistent with strong financial performance, and that it helps enable banks to attract the talent needed to sustain such performance. Yet, we could make greater progress more quickly if this effort were coordinated across the industry. I think bank leaders could benefit from sharing best practices and participating in surveys that would allow them to benchmark their strengths and weaknesses versus others on an ongoing basis.
Building a financial system that is more resilient and robust, having a bank resolution regime that credibly ends “too big to fail,” and building strong cultures that restore the trustworthiness of the financial industry are all goals we must continue to pursue. Without success on all three fronts, I don’t think we can say that we have fully addressed the problems made evident by the financial crisis.（完）
文章来源：纽约联储官网2016年12月5日（本文仅代表作者观点）